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This project intends to set up an 
international outsourcing model to analyze 
international outsourcing contracts and its 
impacts on international trade theory and 
policies. The model consists of three-stage 
game. In the first stage, the domestic 
government chooses optimal export polic in 
order to maximize its welfare; in the second 
stage, the domestic firm (the subcontractor) 
determines the price of subcontracted product; 
in the third stage, both domestic and foreign 
firms engage in Cournot quantity competition 
in the third country market. Two of the main 
conclusions are derived as follows: (i) Given 
the price of the subcontracted product, the 
domestic government will not interfere with the 
exports of the subcontracted product, but if the 
net revenue effect from subcontract is greater 
than the strategic effect its optimal trade policy 
is to impose export tax on the final goods, 
which moves the industry equilibrium to what 
would be, in the absence of export tax, the 
Stackelberg leader-follower position in output 
space with the domestic firm as leader. (ii) 
When the price of the subcontracted product is 
determined by the domestic firm, the optimal 
export policies are to impose export taxes on 
both the exports of the final goods and the 
subcontracted product such that this policy 
moves the industry equilibrium to what would, 
in the absence of export taxes, be the 
Stackelberg leader-follower position in output 
space with the domestic firm as leader. 
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